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DIRECTORS, MANAGEMENT, AND AUDITORS
Allies
in
Protecting
Shareholder
Interests
The Public Oversight Board, 
an independent body 
charged with overseeing and 
monitoring the quality 
control programs of public 
accounting firms that audit 
publicly held companies, 
suggests steps to improve 
the quality of financial 
reporting.  
W hy This Report is Being Issued
Since the Securities Acts of 1933 and 
1934 established financial reporting 
requirements for most publicly held 
corporations, there have been periodic 
efforts to improve the usefulness of 
audited financial statements for sharehold­
ers and other external users of financial 
information. Currently, the Public Oversight 
Board (POB), an independent body 
charged with overseeing and monitoring 
the quality control programs of public 
accounting firms that audit publicly held 
companies, is taking steps to further 
improve the quality of financial reporting.
In 1994 the POB appointed an Advisory 
Panel on Auditor Independence1 to assess 
criticisms about the professionalism of 
independent auditors and consider steps 
to better assure the integrity and 
objectivity of their judgments about the 
application of generally accepted 
accounting principles. Particular attention 
was directed to identifying steps to 
improve the quality of financial reporting.
In accepting the Panel’s report, 
Strengthening the Professionalism of the 
Independent Auditor, the POB determined 
that issues raised by the Panel merit 
consideration by a broad audience of 
corporate directors, chief executives, and 
chief financial officers.
A major topic in the Panel’s report deals 
with strengthening the relationship 
between the board of directors and the 
independent auditor to help directors meet 
their governance responsibilities and
An active and effective board of directors, responsible financial 
management, skeptical and independent auditors, and attentive 
regulatory authorities all have responsibilities to safeguard those 
who invest in public corporations. Effective corporate governance of 
the financial reporting process is an important tool for enabling 
companies and their auditors to fu lfill those responsibilities.
Arthur Levitt
Chairman
Securities and Exchange Commission
improve the quality of financial statements. 
Of the Panel’s ten principal conclusions 
five are related to that topic.
Corporate financial reports require 
numerous judgments in applying generally 
accepted accounting principles to reflect 
the economic substance of transactions 
and events and to determine the 
underlying amounts reported in financial 
statements. Many respondents to the 
Panel’s inquiries observed that corporate 
financial reports, while conforming to 
generally accepted accounting principles, 
do not always reflect the most appropriate 
or useful presentation allowed by those 
principles.
The central suggestion of the Panel is 
that corporate boards and audit 
committees should expect to receive 
and independent auditors should 
deliver forthright, candid, oral reports 
in a timely manner on the quality—not 
just acceptability—of a company’s 
financial reporting. That quality 
assessment should be based on 
judgments about the appropriateness, 
aggressiveness or conservatism of 
selected or contemplated accounting 
principles and estimates and judgments 
about the clarity of disclosures.
By making that suggestion, the Panel’s 
objective is not to narrow the range of 
acceptable accounting practices but to 
give directors a better basis for under­
standing and influencing corporate 
practices. The POB believes that if 
corporate directors and audit committees 
endorse the Panel’s suggested practices 
and establish a supportive climate, the 
result will be a low-cost, non-regulatory 
step toward more credible financial 
reporting.
The Executive Committee of the SEC 
Practice Section2, with the encouragement 
of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants Board of Directors, has
1 The Panel was chaired by Donald J. Kirk, corporate director and former Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board. The other members were George D. Anderson, former Chairman of the AICPA, and Ralph S. Saul, corporate 
director and former Chairman and CEO of CIGNA Corporation. The Panel interviewed auditors, business executives, 
attorneys, academics and government officials and reviewed written submissions and other related reports and studies.
2 The SEC Practice Section is an organization of over 1,250 CPA firms formed to improve the quality of practice of CPA 
firms that audit public companies.
pledged active support for the Panel’s 
suggestions. Recognizing that implemen­
tation of the suggestions requires action by 
all participants in the corporate gover­
nance process, the Section has also 
pledged to help other groups address the 
recommendations directed to them. The 
POB welcomes that support, and looks for 
similar endorsements by those concerned 
with corporate governance.
The remainder of this report explains 
more fully the POB’s call for action and the 
rationale for its recommendations to 
financial managements, independent 
auditors, and boards of directors and audit 
committees.
A  C orporate Governance 
Approach to Improved 
Financial Reporting
The POB urges the board of directors to 
play an active role in the financial reporting 
process and for the auditing profession to 
look to the board of directors — the 
shareholders’ representative — as its 
client. As the shareholders’ representative, 
the board is accountable to them for 
monitoring the company’s performance.
That accountability is discharged, in 
part, by ensuring that shareholders receive 
relevant and reliable financial information 
about the company’s performance and 
financial position. The board should expect
AUDIT COMMITTEES —  A PIVOTAL ROLE, a Deloitte & Touche LLP publication, 
describes the pitfalls of a compliance-based approach to financial reporting and the 
benefits of a corporate governance approach.
The POB Advisory Panel is concerned, and Deloitte & Touche shares the concern, that if 
no action is taken to adjust the course of current trends, we are destined to an ever more 
highly regulated, compliance-based financial reporting environment in which professional 
judgment takes a back seat.
One need only look at our tax laws and regulations to see the results of a totally 
compliance-driven approach. It may appeal to some —  an approach that enforces 
discipline and precision through a myriad of rules. Management and auditors alike would
have rule books and checklists to counter the 
hindsight of litigators and regulators. Auditors 
would have clearer lines to draw in addressing new 
or changed accounting principles, thereby 
eliminating potential conflicts. There may even be 
a higher tolerance for financial reporting failures 
because people typically have lower expectations 
of an end product from a highly regulated process.
The regulated, compliance-based approach does, 
however, have a serious flaw —  its focus is on the 
process rather than on the end product. Such a 
focus could result in less-relevant and less-reliable 
financial information that would be of limited use 
to all. And, it tends to force a one-size-fits-all solution to financial reporting, despite 
differing circumstances and audiences.
In contrast to a highly regulated, compliance-based approach, a corporate governance 
approach focuses on the needs of the users of the financial information and the quality of 
the end product. Professional judgment is its center-piece and its strength. It is also what 
gives this approach a fragile quality —  dependent on the willingness of independent 
auditors and corporate management to discuss with audit committees and outside 
directors what is “ most appropriate,” rather than what is merely “acceptable.” Responsi­
bility and accountability are the foundation for this approach —  rules and regulations only 
provide a framework for making the best professional judgments.
Corporate governance in the United States is not working the way it should. 
The problem is not the system of laws, regulations, and judicial decisions 
which are the framework of corporate governance. It is the failure by too 
many boards of directors to make the system work the way it should. This 
state of affairs suggests clearly to us that more effective corporate governance 
depends vitally on strengthening the role of the board of directors.
Martin Lipton 
Partner, Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz
the auditor to assist it in meeting that 
responsibility to the shareholders, and the 
auditor should assume the obligation to do 
so. This requires what is referred to herein 
as a “corporate governance” approach to 
financial reporting in contrast to a rule- 
driven, compliance-based approach. By 
bringing the independent auditor into the 
mainstream of corporate governance, an 
auditor’s professional services will add 
value and not be performed simply to meet 
a regulatory requirement.
The POB believes that present 
practices followed by well governed 
corporations foster an environment where 
the independent auditor, management, 
audit committees and boards of directors 
play interactive and timely roles in the 
financial reporting process. This is 
accomplished by both financial manage­
ment and the external auditor discussing 
important financial reporting issues with 
the audit committee and, when needed, 
the board of directors in a timely manner. 
These existing practices need to be more 
widely adopted and, in the view of the 
POB, enhanced.
Responsibilities of Managem ent
As partners in the financial reporting 
process, each with a unique and possibly 
different insight and perspective, 
management, the independent auditor, and 
the audit committee should exchange and 
understand each other’s point of view in 
reaching decisions that 
affect shareholders’ 
interests.
To accomplish this, 
financial management 
should assume an 
obligation to bring to the 
attention of both the 
independent auditor 
and audit committee 
the accounting 
implications of 
significant new 
transactions and
policies while they are being contem­
plated, not after the fact or after financial 
information based on them has been 
released publicly. This is critical to an 
effective corporate governance approach 
to financial reporting.
Candid discussion between manage­
ment and the auditors will often lead to 
complete agreement about the most 
appropriate practices to recommend to the 
audit committee, but will, in some cases, 
define differing views of management and 
the auditing firm. Differences of opinion are 
healthy because they alert the audit 
committee to the choices the corporation 
has and the merits of alternative courses 
of action. While management and the 
auditor will find their judgments questioned 
by the audit committee on occasion, that is 
a small price to pay for enhanced 
oversight of the financial reporting 
process.
As a director, it ’s not the accounting issues that 
are brought to my attention that worry me. It’s 
the ones that I am not aware of. Expert assistance 
is always obtainable. Clairvoyance is harder to 
come by.
This report calls for the participants in the financial reporting process to take a 
logical and necessary next step to improve corporate governance and the quality of 
financial information provided to investors.  The audit committee and board must 
insist upon, and financial management and the auditor must deliver, their candid 
views about the most appropriate accounting principles and estimates—not just their 
acceptability—and the clarity of the related disclosures of financial information that 
the company reports publicly.
Paul Kolton 
Corporate Director 
Former CEO, American Stock 
Exchange
Responsibilities of the  
Independent A uditor
The POB agrees with the Panel that it is 
essential for the auditing profession to 
bring greater clarity to the issue of who is 
their client. The board of directors, as the 
representative of the shareholders, should 
be the client, not corporate management. 
Corporate boards and audit committees 
should make this clear to auditors.
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
concluded that the independent public 
accountant “owes ultimate allegiance to 
the corporation’s creditors and stockhold­
ers, as well as to the investing public. This 
‘public watchdog’ function demands that 
the accountant maintain total indepen­
dence from the client at all times and 
requires complete fidelity to the public 
trust.”
In most companies today, management 
selects or recommends auditors and 
changes in auditors, negotiates fees, 
selects accounting principles, makes 
estimates, prepares the financial 
statements, and monitors the audit. 
Clearly, a smooth working relationship 
between auditor and management is 
important, but there can be a downside. 
Too close a relationship can discourage 
the auditor from speaking up if the auditor 
questions the accounting principles 
selected, the clarity of disclosures, or the 
estimates and judgments made by 
management.
For years, auditing standards have 
required the auditor to judge whether the 
accounting principles selected by 
management are “appropriate in the
circumstances.” The standard to which the 
auditor has been held in making that 
judgment has been whether the selected 
principle falls within the range of 
acceptable practice. The POB endorses 
the Panel’s suggestion that the auditor 
should now be held to a higher standard in 
communicating with management and the 
board of directors.
—
To accomplish 
this, the auditor 
should express his 
or her views about 
the appropriate­
ness, not just the 
acceptability, of the 
accounting 
principles and 
financial disclosure 
practices used or 
proposed to be 
adopted by the 
company and, 
particularly, about 
the degree of aggressiveness or 
conservatism of its accounting principles 
and underlying estimates and the 
relevance and reliability of the resulting 
information for investment, credit, and 
similar decisions.
These communications should be 
based on the auditor’s independent 
evaluation of best financial reporting 
practices applicable to the company’s 
environment. Such financial reporting 
practices should not be prescribed by new 
professional standards. Such standards, if 
they could be developed, would tend to 
result in boilerplate language, which would 
not be in the best interests of the auditor, 
management, or the board of directors.
Audit is about governance; it derives from the Latin word 
meaning “ to hear,”  it is about upholding the integrity of 
financial reporting and business conduct, it is about 
seeking the truth. It is not about stifling the objectives of 
entities but constructively adding value to confidence in 
those entities...Audit is about judgment, which in the final 
analysis is personal; an expert view with personal 
accountability.
The Audit Agenda
The Auditing Practices Board
United Kingdom
Responsibilities of Boards of 
Directors and Audit 
C om m ittees
Over the past decade, the influence of 
management on the corporate governance 
process has ebbed as boards of directors 
have assumed the long-acknowledged but 
only sometimes-practiced role as “the 
fulcrum of accountability” in the corporate 
governance system.
The trend in corporate governance is to 
hold the board more accountable to 
shareholders and management more 
accountable to the board. Increased 
oversight by directors and expansion of 
the role of auditors in helping the board 
exercise its responsibility will keep the 
management-auditor relationship in 
balance.
Boards of directors have a fiduciary 
responsibility to shareholders and others 
for reliable financial reports. To meet that 
responsibility they should be aware of the 
implications of alternative accounting 
principles for reporting significant 
transactions and events as well as the 
aggressiveness or conservatism of 
significant estimates. It is vital, therefore, 
that audit committees function effectively 
as the board’s primary contact with both 
financial management and the indepen­
dent auditor.
With the right atmosphere — the audit 
committee recognizing its responsibilities 
and auditors expanding theirs — the result 
will be a forthright interchange of 
professional views, thereby giving 
directors a better basis for influencing 
corporate reporting practices. In most
Directors must not wait passively for a crisis before they intervene. 
Their job, even in the normal course of events, is an important one, 
and they must have the necessary power to do it. Power, as we have 
used the term, implies the time and knowledge, which not only 
contribute to power but also allow its intelligent applications.
Jay W. Lorsch 
Professor
Harvard Graduate School of 
Business Administration
situations where management and 
auditors differ on the appropriateness of 
accounting treatments, the audit 
committee can be a catalyst for all parties 
to thoroughly discuss and understand 
each other’s rationale. Most often this 
should lead to agreement on what 
accounting treatment is most appropriate. 
However, if management and the auditor 
do not reach agreement the audit 
committee and the board need to be fully 
informed and reach a judgment about what 
accounting treatment is most appropriate 
for public reporting to investors and others.
The independent auditor can add to the 
effectiveness of the full board in monitoring 
corporate performance on behalf of 
shareholders—without detracting from the 
roles of financial management and the 
audit committee—by occasional 
attendance at full board meetings when 
the audit committee reports on its 
activities. This may be particularly 
appropriate when there are independent 
directors who are not members of the audit 
committee. It should also help provide a 
basis for the board to recommend to the 
shareholders the appointment of the 
auditor or ratification of the board’s 
selection of the auditor.
Legal Implications
Many legal actions against directors have 
alleged that the financial statements of 
their companies in some fashion misled 
investors. Some observers have 
suggested the recommendations calling 
for expanded discussions about the 
appropriateness of accounting principles, 
disclosures, and estimates will increase 
the exposure of board members to 
litigation.
The POB does not believe this will be a 
likely outcome. First, the procedures 
recommended will reduce the possibility 
that the financial statements are in fact 
misleading, thus reducing the danger of 
finding directors at fault. Second, the 
additional steps taken by board members 
should be persuasive in convincing courts 
and juries that the financial statements 
were prepared with care and that every 
measure was taken to avoid the 
statements being misleading. In time, as 
the increased care becomes apparent, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys should be less willing 
to undertake the risks involved in making 
claims that financial statements were 
faulty.
Conclusion
In summary, three steps are needed to further improve the credibility of financial 
reporting. ( 1)  The board of directors must recognize the primacy of its accountabil­
ity  to shareholders. ( 2 )  The auditor must look to the board of directors as the 
client. ( 3 )  The board, and its audit committee, must expect and the auditor must 
deliver candid communication about the quality of the company's financial 
reporting. Ways for audit committees to implement these suggestions are set forth 
below. Establishing a supportive climate for the resulting process to work effectively 
is a task for all directors.
W h a t the Audit C o m m ittee  
Should Do
The POB urges that audit committees 
take action to ensure that their charter or 
terms of reference include or provide for 
the following:
■ An instruction to the independent 
auditor that the board of directors, as 
the shareholders’ representative, is the 
auditor’s client.
■ An expectation that financial manage­
ment and the independent auditor 
perform a timely analysis of significant 
financial reporting issues and practices.
■ An expectation that financial manage­
ment and the independent auditor 
discuss with the audit committee their 
qualitative judgments about the 
appropriateness, not just the 
acceptability, of accounting 
principles and financial disclosure 
practices used or proposed to be 
adopted by the company and, 
particularly, about the degree of 
aggressiveness or conservatism of its 
accounting principles and underlying 
estimates.
■ An opportunity for the independent 
auditor to be available to the full board 
of directors at least annually to help 
provide a basis for the board to 
recommend to shareholders the 
appointment of the auditor or ratification 
of the board’s selection of the auditor.
The audit committee discussion with the 
independent auditor about the appropriate­
ness of accounting principles and financial
disclosure practices should generally
include the following:
■ the auditor’s independent qualitative 
judgments about the appropriateness, 
not just the acceptability, of the 
accounting principles and the clarity of 
the financial disclosure practices used 
or proposed to be adopted by the 
company
■ the auditor’s views about whether 
management’s choices of accounting 
principles are conservative, moderate, 
or extreme from the perspective of 
income, asset, and liability recognition, 
and whether those principles are 
common practices or are minority 
practices
■ the auditor’s reasoning in determining 
the appropriateness of changes in 
accounting principles and disclosure 
practices
■ the auditor’s reasoning in determining 
the appropriateness of the accounting 
principles and disclosure practices 
adopted by management for new 
transactions or events
■ the auditor’s reasoning in accepting or 
questioning significant estimates made 
by management
■ the auditor’s views about how the 
company’s choices of accounting 
principles and disclosure practices may 
affect shareholders and public views 
and attitudes about the company.
Copies of the report of the Advisory Panel on 
Auditor Independence Strengthening the 
Professionalism of the Independent Auditor, or 
additional copies of this report, can be obtained 
by contacting the Public Oversight Board’s 
offices.
Public Oversight Board
One Station Place, Stamford, CT 06902 
(203) 353-5300
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